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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN

A. GEORG EDES,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)

v.
BONI

No. 17073

)
)

A. GEORGEDES,

)
)

Defendant and Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF PLAIHTIFF-RESPONDENT
JOHN A. GEORGEDES
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is &n action in divorce.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Decree of Divorce was entered awarding each of the parties
a Dec:cee of Divorce from the other; awarding plaintiff all home and

business real property and

oth~r

business an<l personal assets; award-

ing defendant certain personal property and restoration of her former
name.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's decision and
order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent believes the following taken from the trial court's
Memorandum Decision and Findings accurately and briefly states the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Statement of Facts an<l the Nature of the Case:
The parties were married 15 April 1972.

"[E)ven though

the marriage lasted seven years there did not exist in fact

~e

usual husband-wife and family association that makes a successful marriage for most of that period of time."
Record, p. 92, hereinafter "R. 92").

(Trial Court

Even though " [ t)he Plain-

tiff worked hard and provided a comfortable standard of living
for the Defendant [over a period of seven years] and made it
possible for her to continue her education .
little in return."

he received

(R. 9 2) .

The court concluded that lack of co!ill11unication may have con·
tributed to this unusual lack of marital relations and therefore
granted a divorce to both parties.

It was not denied that one

week after the marriage was concluded defendant moved her seven·
year-old son into her bedroom with her and moved her husband
into the basement.

(R. 120).

duration of the marriage.

This became his bedroom for the

(R. 121).

The evidence also showed

that even social relations were strained and limited <luring the
entire marriage and that plaintiff, especially during the last
three years of the marriage, took most of his meals away from
home.

(R. 121).
In determining the equities relative to distribution of

assets the court concluded "the Defendant has an annual income
of Nine Thousand ($9,000.00) Dollars per year [She teaches at
the College] . . . plus she receives Three Hundred Sixty Eight
($368.00) Dollars per month for the support of her fifteen (15)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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year old son and from which she is entitled to a contribution
for his share of food and household and transportation expense."
(This is Social Security for defendant's son by a prior marriage)
(R. 93).

Defendant's child is also the owner and beneficiary

of a Trustee Passbook Savings Account as the result of an award
by the Industrial Commission of Utah as a lump sum settlement

awarded for the death of his father.
During the marriage plaintiff paid regularly to the defendant
$600.00 a month plus paying all the utilities and other incidental
expenses.

The defendant instead of using the money provided by

social security banked it, together with a substantial portion
of the support paid her by plaintiff, so that she accumulated
assets during the marriage in excess of $25,000.

This accumu-

lation was "made possible only as a result of the marriage."
(R. 123).

She also purchased an interest in property in Joe's

Valley in the name of her son fer which she paid $4,500.00.
The income of plaintiff in 1978 shows $11,000 with an expected income in 1979 of the same amount.

"[HJ e is required to

pay under a prior Divorce Decree . . . Four Thousand One Hundred
Sixty-Eight and 80/100 ($4,068.80) Dollars per year leaving him
. . . for his necessities

. approximately Five Hundred

Seventy ($570.00) Dollars per month to live on.

The business

operated by the Plaintiff does not produce enough income to
meet the monthly debts and obligations owed by the Plaintiff and
he keeps the business operating because his father does not demand
prompt payment of the obligations owed to him for the purchase of
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the business which means in effect that Plaintiff ls operating
the business purely out of cbnrity shown by his father."
Because of the foregoing findings,

the court concluded

(R. 93

that~~

defendant was not entitled to alimony or attorney fees.
At the time of the marriage plaintiff was the owner of real
estate and a cle&ning business.

"[T)he business and property

. . . carried an indebtedness of approximately Fifty Two Thousanc
($52,000.00) Dollars . . . . "

(R. 94).

At the time of the

divorce the same business and property carried an indebtedness
of $110,000.00.

(R. 94).

While the court recognized that the

real property could have increased in value because of inflatior,
he concluded "there is no evidence

of any increase in net

worth that is not offset by the increase in indebtedness."
(R. 94).

Further, "The evidence shows that the business has

little value from an income standpoint and remains open purely
as a result of the charity of the Plaintiff's father."

(R. 94).

At the time of trial plaintiff was indebted to banks, his
father, and his former wife in the sum of $123,446.20, an increase of about $30,000 since his marriage in 1972.

(R. 122).

The personal property was disposed of by giving defendant
and plaintiff itemized personal property which neither party
appears to seriously challenge.
The principal objection of defendant goes to the court's
awarding all the real estate and the business (owned by plaintiff at the time of marriage) to plaintiff and refusing to grant
defendant attorney fees or alimony.
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ARGUtlENT
I.

Tl!E TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH BROAD DISCRETION TO
DETEW!II;E THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO A DIVORCE DECREE
'
AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISIOH WILL BE OVERTURNED
OllLY IF SERIOUS INEQUITY HAS RESULTED FROM AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT.

Utah Code Ann.

§

30-3-5(1) (1979 Supp.) reads, in relevant

part, as fol lows:
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may
make such orders in r8lation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable.
In making its order pursuant to a divorce decree, the trial court
has "considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial
and property inLerests."
(Utah 1977).

Enelish v. English, 565 P. 2d 409, 410

The trial court's decision will be overturned only

where the trial court has clearly misunderstood or misapplied
the law, resulting in substantial or prejudicial error; or where
the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's
decision; or where such a serious inequity has resulted as to
demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.
II.

Id.

THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS
CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IS ON THE APPELLANT.

The trial court's order pursuant to a divorce decree is
invested with a presumption of validity.
527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).

Mitchell v. Mitchell,

On appeal from the trial court's de-

cision, the burden is on the appellant to prove that the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's findings;
that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law result~g

in substantial and

pre~udicial

error; or that such a serious
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inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
by the trial court.
III.

discreti~

Id.

THE TRIAL COUIZT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
MAKING ITS DECISION Arm ORDER rn THIS CASE.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE llATUI-:C
OF THE l1ARRIAGE IN MAKING ITS DECISION.

In Point II of her brief, defendant claims that the trial
court ignored the parties' marriaEe in making its award.

The

trial court in fact recognized the parties' lawful marriage.
(R. 92).

Houever, the court in its discretion took into account

the nature of the marriage, along with all other relevant factors, in arriving at its decision.

The nature of the parties'

marriage "as far as the conduct of the parties was concerned [<:a,
one of relative short duration."

(R. 92).

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff supported defendant to the best of his ability and
helped to finance her education, but the court acknowledged and
properly considered the fact that the relationship between the
parties was different from normal family relationships,

and~~

the parties enjoyed a relatively short period of norrilal marital
relations.
In support of her argument, defendant cites Engish v.
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).

That case held that the tr~!

court had improperly considered the long duration of the marriage
in fixing alimony, and the alimony award was cut in half.

In

Barrett v. Barrett, 17 Utah 2d 1, 403 P.2d 649, 651 (1965), on
the other hand, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the
marriage of the parties in the case "

. was a

misadventur~
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and was of comparatively short duration."

On that basis the

court reduced the duration of the trial court's alimony award.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that
despite its apparent statement to the contrary in English v.
~glish,

supra, " . . . the duration of the marriage is an

appropriate factor to be considered in awarding alimony,

"

Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453, 455 n. 1 (Utah 1978).
In the present case, the trial court properly considered
not only the type of relationship the parties had during their
marriage, but also the financial condition

of the parties and

their current and prospective financial needs.

The trial court

had all of the facts presented to it to consider in making its
alimony award, and thus was in a unique position to determine
the conditions and needs of the parties and the way in which
their marital relationship had affected those conditions and
needs.

This Court should uphold the trial court's decision

based on the trial court's discretion to consider all relevant
facts.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE PARTIES'
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS IN MAKING ITS PROPERTY AND
ALIMONY AWARDS.

In Points III and IV of her brief, the defendant claims
that the trial court improperly considered the savings account
set up for defendant's child and the financial status of plaintiff in making its property division and alimony award.

In so

arguing the defendant ignores the main purpose of alimony. which
is "to provide support for the \vife as nearly as possible at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent
the wife from becoming a public charge."
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).

EnE,lish v. English, 565

The criteria to be used in making

this determination include the wife's financial condition and
needs, her ability to earn a sufficient income, and the husband's
ability to provide support.
at 411-412.

English v.

Englisl~,

supra, 565 P.2d

A review of the trial court's decision in this case

reveals that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in disallowing alimony.
The defendant states that the plaintiff supported defendant
with payments of $600. 00 per month during most of their marriage
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 12).

The trial court found that the de-

fendant now has a net monthly income of $600.00, in addition to
the $368.00 per month she receives for the support of her son,
for a total of $938.00.

(R. 93).

The trial court also found

that the plaintiff has a net monthly income of $570.00.

(R. 93).

Clearly the defendant is in no danger of becoming a "public
charge."

Furthermore, the defendant is able to support herself

at a standard of living at least equal to that which she enjoyed
during the marriage, and the plaintiff's ability to provide support is severely limited, if not nonexistent.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (l) (Supp. 1979), the trial
court is given the power to make awards pursuant to a divorce
decree "as may be equitable."

The trial court exercised its

discretion in this case by considering the parties' financial
conditions, needs, and abilities in making its award.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

It was

proper for the trial court to consider all of the assets available to each of the parties in analyzing the relative financial
positions of the parties.

The purpose of awards pursuant to a

divorce decree is not to punish either of the parties, but rather
to assure that each of the parties is as well provided for as
can equitably be ordPred.
pose in th.i.s

The trial court accomplished that pur-

c~se.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT MADE A PROPER DIVISION OF PROPERTY
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

In Point II of her brief, the defendant argues that the
trial court disregarded her joint tenancy interest in one of the
businesses and in the parties' home in awarding the home and the
business to the plaintiff.

The fact that the defendant may have

legally owned an interest in the home and business is irrelevant
to the trial court's power to divide the property as it may deem
equitable.

Under Utah Code Ann.

§

30-3-5 (1) (Supp. 1979), "the

Court may make such orders in relation to . . . property and
parties .

as may be equitable."

The trial court recognized

the nature of the defendant's interests in the property, and made
its award on the basis of the evidence before it.
The defendant goes on to argue at length that the trial
court's division of property was not in agreement with some of
the evidence.

However, the issue now before this Court is not

whether the trial court's decision is in complete agreement
With each part of the evidence, but whether the decision has
resulted in such a serious inequity as to indicate a clear abuse
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of discretion by the trial court.

409 (Utah 1977).

Ent:;lish v.

Engl_~j~,

565 l' .2d

The defendant now attempts to overturn the

trial court's decision on the bilsis of the defendant's own appraisal of the home and the "appilrent equity" in the lilundry
business (Defendant's brief, pp. 7-8).

The trial court found

that the home and buhiness had realized little, if any,
increases in value.(R. 121).

apprcci~~

Furthermore, the trial court

fo~d

that the plaintiff's total indebtedness at the time of trial was
approximately $123,446.29, an increase of about $30,000.00 from
the beginning of the marriage.

(R. 122).

The trial court was in a unique position to judge the

quanti~

quality, and validity of the evidence presented to it regarding
the value of the property to be divided between the parties.
It is clear that the parties' relationship during their

marria~

was not typical of marital relationships; that the plaintiff
supported the defendant as well as could have been expected
during the unusual and strained marital relationship; and that the
defendant is now in a financial position as good as (if not better than) that of the plaintiff.

The trial court did not abuse

its discretion in awarding the home and business to the plaintiff, an<l the award has not resulted in a serious inequity.

The

trial court's property award should be upheld.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT PIWPERLY REFUSED TO GRAnT
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT

Under Utah Code Ann.

§

require a party to a divorce

30-3-3 (1953), the trial court may
p1~cecding

to pay to the other

party a sum of money to enable the other party to prosecutl' or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defend the action.

In Weiss v. Weiss, 111 U. 353, 179 P.2d

1005, 1011 (1947), this Court interpreted that statute to permit
awards of attorney's fees, "provided the necessity for such awards
is found to exist."

Thus the issue once again is whether the

trial court abused its discretion in such a way as to result in
a serious inequity by failing to require that the plaintiff pay
the defendant's attorney's fees.
The trial court stated that the purpose of the statute is
to assure that neither party is denied access to court because
of inability to pay legal fees, and found that the defendant
had not demonstrated an ability to pay legal fees.

(R. 96).

The defendant now claims that the trial court's award of the
"income producing assets of the marriage" to the plaintiff left
the defendant with no way to pay her attorney (Defendant's brief,
p. 14).

This is in direct contradiction to the trial court's

finding that the property awarded to the palintiff has little,
if any, income-producing capacity.

(R. 121).

Furthermore, the

trial court found that the defendant now has a monthly income
of $600.00 in addition to $368.00 per month for child support
from a prior marriage.

(R. 93).

The defendant's claim that she

is unable to pay her attorney is without factual basis, and the
trial court's decision not to require plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The defendant originally moved for a new trial on the basis
of surprise and inadequate damages. (R. 98).

The defendant now
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urges more specifically that the trial court was biased (Defendant's brief, p. 111).

l~egardless

of the basis for the motion,

the question of whether a new trial will be granted is within tlc
broad discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial will be overturned on appeal only if
the trial court abused its discretion.
U. 122, 247 P. 2d 264 (1952).

Crellin v. Thomas, 122

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in this case.
The first basis for defendant's motion was surprise, in that
the defendant was unaware of a fund set up for the use of defendant's minor child by the Industrial Commi.ssion of Utah.
Defendant's motion was supported by an affidavit of her attorney
stating that she had "simply forgotten about it."

(R. 108).

Furthermore, the fund is of little relevance to the case because,
apart from the Indus trial Cornrnission fund,

defendant is earning

about $600.00 per month in addition to a $368.00 monthly support
payment for her child.

Thus the supposedly newly discovered evi-

dence is not such "substantial material evidence, from which it
appears there is at least a reasonable likelihood that it would
affect the result in a new trial."

Crellin v. Thomas, supra,

247 P.2d at 265.
The defendant has also based her appeal of the trial court's
refusal to grant a new trial on several grounds not brought before the trial court, such as the trial court's setting of the
trial date and several allegedly improper procedural matters.
(Defendant's brief, pp. 15-16).

The Supreme Court is limited in'
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its review of defendant's motion to the matters before the trial
court, and will not consider matters brought for the first time
before the Supreme Court.
P.2d 430 (1970).

Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472

The plaintiff has already rebutted the grounds

alleged in defendant's original motion in plaintiff's Answer to
Motion for New Trial.

(R. 129-135).

are not properly before this Court.

The new grounds alleged
The trial court determined

in its broad discretion that defendant's allegations were insufficient to require a new trial.

The trial court did not abuse

that discretion, and its decision should not now be overturned.
V.

CONCLUSION.
The issue before the Court is whether the trial court in

this case abused its discretion in making its award of property
and alimony, causing a serious inequity to the defendant.

The

preceding discussion demonstrates that the parties had an unusual
marital relationship.

The plaintiff supported the defendant

regularly during the marriage and helped to finance the defendant's
education, despite the plaintiff's lack of a substantial income.
The defendant now has a substantial income, supplemented by a
monthly social security payment for the support of her child,
and the plaintiff is earning a subsistence-level income.

To

require now that the plaintiff pay part of his limited income to
the defendant as alimony would be to penalize the plaintiff and
~

award a windfall to the defendant.

The trial court made its

award and property division on the basis of all of the facts
before it.

l

The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The
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plaintiff, therefore, requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court.
DATED this 15th day of September, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

I

I

;tLc/7 :t:.//£ G1~ ~J-;I
Theraldt1. Jensen
(/
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
190 Nor~h Carbon Avenue
Price, Utah 8Lf501

~~/./~~
&k{j;~~ft
~~

CliJ;forcl ·L. Ash ton
Att':&"rney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Suite 1600, 50 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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